Trump Puts Taiwan Arms Package in Play After Beijing Summit With Xi

President Donald Trump departed Beijing on May 16 without committing to a $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, telling reporters aboard Air Force One that he would "make a determination over the next fairly short period" after two days of talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping. ^[1][2] The statement places in formal doubt a weapons package that Congress pre-approved in January 2025 and that Taiwan's Legislative Yuan funded earlier this month through a special $25 billion defense appropriation. ^[3][8]

The legal backdrop matters. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan proceed under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which directs the executive branch to provide Taiwan with defensive articles and services. A separate executive commitment, the Six Assurances of 1982, explicitly bars Washington from consulting Beijing before deciding on Taiwan arms sales. Trump acknowledged both frameworks in his Air Force One remarks, noting the issue had come up in talks with Xi, but he dismissed the 1982 assurance as an obligation "wrote in 1982" that he was not bound to honor. ^[3][4] That position, if operationalized, would mark a break from standing U.S. policy across administrations of both parties. Prior to departing for Beijing, Trump had already signaled his willingness to set that commitment aside, telling reporters at the White House that he would discuss arms sales with Xi despite Xi's opposition to them. ^[9][16]

The $14 billion package, which includes missiles and air defense interceptors, has been pending since the Biden administration's final weeks and has cleared all required congressional notifications. ^[3][5] The administration had already withheld arms deliveries following a separate $11 billion sale approved in December 2024, which itself prompted Chinese military exercises near the island. ^[5][10] A bipartisan Senate letter sent before the summit, led by Sens. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.) and Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), urged Trump to formally notify the $14 billion package to Congress before meeting Xi. ^[8] Congressional critics pressed harder after Trump's return. Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.), ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said Congress had already acted and that Trump alone was "holding it up." ^[5] Speaker Mike Johnson reiterated his support for Taiwan but said he had not yet received a full readout of the Beijing talks. ^[5] Trump, for his part, told Fox News in a prerecorded interview that he views the pending sale as "a very good negotiating chip." ^[5]

Xi used the summit to frame Taiwan as the defining variable in bilateral stability. According to a Chinese Foreign Ministry readout, Xi warned that if the Taiwan issue is handled "improperly," the two countries will "have clashes and even conflicts, putting the entire relationship in great jeopardy." ^[5][18] Xi also called Taiwan "the most important issue" in the bilateral relationship. ^[13] Trump confirmed to reporters that Xi "talked a lot" about Taiwan and that he had made "no commitment either way." ^[5] Trump further said he would need to speak with "the person who is running Taiwan" before deciding, an apparent reference to President Lai Ching-te, though any direct communication with Lai would itself antagonize Beijing. ^[3] The summit took place May 14-15 at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, the first visit by a sitting U.S. president to China in nine years. ^[21]

The Iran dimension produced its own internal contradiction. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in an interview with Fox News' Sean Hannity aboard Air Force One before the summit that the U.S. delegation would push Xi to take an "active role" in reopening the Strait of Hormuz, through which China receives the largest share of its maritime oil supply. ^[21][23][29] Trump, speaking to reporters after the summit, denied asking Xi for pressure on Iran, saying: "I don't need favors." That characterization conflicts with Rubio's pre-summit remarks and with Trump's own statements to Fox News that Xi had expressed willingness to help. ^[30] The Chinese Foreign Ministry's official readout of the bilateral did not address Iran in specific terms, with a spokesperson reiterating China's general position that the ceasefire should hold and the strait should reopen. ^[4] Chinese purchases account for roughly 90 percent of exported oil from Iran, according to a March report from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. ^[23] That economic dependence formed the stated basis for Rubio's argument that Beijing shared an interest in pressing Tehran, even as Beijing publicly avoided any posture that would appear to align it with U.S. war aims against a strategic partner.

The Taiwan arms question now enters a legally and politically constrained holding pattern. Taiwan's Legislative Yuan appropriated the defense funds; the administration has not moved on formal executive notification. The window matters: analysts at the Council on Foreign Relations have noted that Beijing will almost certainly condition any reciprocal state visit by Xi to Washington on the administration delaying further arms sales, creating institutional pressure to hold the package into next year. ^[20] Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the obligation to sell defensive arms is statutory, not discretionary. If the administration withholds notification indefinitely, it faces potential legal challenge, as well as legislative pushback from a Congress that has shown bipartisan support for the package. The next major inflection point will be any formal executive decision, or continued inaction, on the $14 billion notification, which congressional supporters have framed as required by law. ^[8]