Trump Defends War Timing on Nuclear Grounds as Gulf Hostilities Resume

President Donald Trump publicly defended the timing of U.S. military operations against Iran, arguing in an interview published June 3 that delaying the campaign past the November midterm elections would have allowed Tehran to complete a nuclear weapon. Trump made the remarks on the New York Post's "Pod Force One with Miranda Devine" podcast. Trump told the host, "I'm the one that started it because, again, I don't wanna bore anybody, but I started it because we can't let them have a nuclear weapon." The interview surfaced as fresh hostilities tested a ceasefire in the Gulf and peace negotiations showed no sign of resolution.

Trump's nuclear justification sits in direct tension with the administration's own prior characterizations of Operation Midnight Hammer, the June 22, 2025, B-2 bomber strikes that targeted Iranian nuclear infrastructure. On June 22, 2025, U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft struck the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, the Natanz Nuclear Facility, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center using GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs carried by B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, along with Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from a submarine. Following those strikes, Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth repeatedly described Iranian nuclear capabilities as destroyed. Claims by Hegseth that "Iran's nuclear ambitions have been obliterated" appear to have been overstated, as the strikes rendered centrifuges, equipment, and facilities unusable but left important details about the nuclear program unknown. Independent analysts have since assessed the damage more cautiously. Retired General and former CIA Director David Petraeus agreed the strike inflicted "severe damage" to Iran's nuclear program but raised the question of whether highly enriched uranium or centrifuges had been stored elsewhere. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which tracks Iran's declared nuclear program, has been unable to access the targeted sites since the 2025 strikes. The IAEA said that, while Iran has refused to allow inspections of its damaged sites after the 2025 war, there was no evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons program.

The internal contradictions are not confined to public statements. Trump repeated his assessment that U.S. forces "obliterated" Iran's nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan when announcing the February 28, 2026, air campaign, yet a November 2025 White House document stated the strikes had "significantly degraded Iran's nuclear program," not eliminated it. At a congressional hearing, Representative Adam Smith argued that the administration contradicted itself by claiming Operation Midnight Hammer was a success only to subsequently enter another war against Iran to eliminate its nuclear capabilities. The administration launched the February 28 strikes without seeking a congressional authorization for the use of military force. Trump did not seek congressional approval for the military action. Trump issued letters to congressional leaders under the 1973 War Powers Resolution, satisfying the notification requirement under 50 U.S.C. § 1543 but not seeking an affirmative authorization. Democrats and a handful of Republicans in the House and Senate pushed to consider war powers resolutions addressing Iran in the weeks following the February strikes.

On the same day the interview published, hostilities flared along multiple fronts. Flights at Kuwait International Airport were suspended after an Iranian drone and missile attack damaged airport facilities and diplomatic missions, killing one person and injuring more than 60 others, according to Kuwaiti authorities and state media. U.S. Central Command said it carried out "defensive strikes" in southern Iran, targeting missile launch sites and Iranian boats seeking to lay mines, and conducted strikes on Qeshm Island near the Strait of Hormuz after attempted Iranian attacks. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi posted on X that Iranian armed forces were conducting "self-defense strikes on sites the U.S. is permitted to use to attack civilian shipping and violate the ceasefire." The day's attacks tested a shaky ceasefire agreed in early April, sending oil prices up more than 2 percent, with the strait remaining largely closed more than three months after U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran began.

The Strait of Hormuz remains the central pressure point in both the military and diplomatic tracks. Iranian attacks targeted oil infrastructure in the region, including vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world's oil passes. In briefings held before the February 2026 attacks, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned Trump that an attack could prompt Iran to close the strait. Reopening the waterway has become the core U.S. demand in ceasefire talks. Tehran has conditioned any deal on an end to fighting in Lebanon and also wants access to billions of dollars in oil revenues, waivers on sanctions on crude exports, a lifting of the U.S. blockade on its ports, and continued leverage over the strait. Negotiations appear stalled. Trump said talks were continuing, though Iran's semi-official Tasnim news agency reported that Iran had not responded to the United States in recent days and that exchanges of texts through intermediaries were suspended until Iran's conditions on Lebanon were met.

In the same interview, Trump offered a separate, and potentially significant, diplomatic representation regarding Iran's nuclear posture. Trump said Iran had agreed not to have nuclear weapons, stating, "We can't let them have a nuclear weapon," and claiming, "They've already agreed they're not gonna have a nuclear weapon." He acknowledged, however, that Iran could change its mind. The form in which Iran ostensibly agreed not to have a nuclear weapon remains unclear. The claim aligns with the administration's stated top priority for any settlement but conflicts with Iran's consistent public position. Iran maintains its atomic program is for peaceful purposes. Whether the purported Iranian commitment constitutes a binding diplomatic understanding, an informal exchange through intermediaries, or an aspirational statement remains unverified, and the administration has not released any documentation to support it.