IAEA Chief Asserts MOU Mandates Nuclear Inspections as Iran Pushes Back

The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency stated publicly this week that the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran explicitly requires IAEA supervision of Iranian nuclear activities, pushing back against Tehran's assertion that inspections of bombed sites remain off the table pending a final agreement. The exchange marks the sharpest public divergence yet between the IAEA and Iranian officials over what the MOU actually commits Tehran to do.

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi told reporters during a visit to Japan that the MOU signed with the U.S. "explicitly" states that "nuclear activities that are going to be carried out with regards to nuclear material facilities will be supervised by the IAEA." Grossi made the remarks at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, pointing to the instrument itself: "there has been a memorandum of understanding, signed by both presidents." He added that dates and locations of any inspections are currently being discussed with Iran, with a decision expected soon. Grossi stated plainly: "There is an agreement and to comply with that agreement, the IAEA will have to have access and inspect. We hope to be there soon."

The MOU in question was signed remotely on June 17, 2026, by President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, establishing a 60-day extension of the ceasefire to negotiate the final terms of a deal. The agreement states that the U.S. and Iran will address Iran's existing stockpile of enriched material, "with the minimum methodology to be down blending on site" under IAEA supervision. The mechanism for implementing that plan is to be finalized within the 60-day negotiating window, with the U.S. committing to grant all required licenses and waivers for associated financial transactions. Major issues, however, including Iran's nuclear program and uranium stockpiles, were deferred to talks during the 60-day ceasefire extension.

Iran's government contested Grossi's characterization directly. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi stated there are currently no plans to grant IAEA access to attacked nuclear facilities or nuclear material, and that such issues would only be addressed within the framework of a final agreement, and after "practical steps" to lift U.S. sanctions on Iran. Gharibabadi also noted that Tehran did not meet with Grossi while in Switzerland, despite his request. Separately, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said there was no "clear schedule" for the IAEA to examine nuclear facilities struck by the U.S. and Israel. U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters outside the White House on Tuesday that IAEA inspectors would be heading to Iran, but that there is "no rush."

The verification dispute turns on a stockpile whose disposition remains unknown. The IAEA estimates Iran held approximately 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to up to 60 percent before the conflict began, close to the 90 percent threshold for weapons-grade material and well above the 3.67 percent limit set by the now-defunct 2015 nuclear agreement. If enriched further, that quantity would be sufficient for approximately 10 nuclear weapons, according to an IAEA yardstick. Without access to enrichment sites, the IAEA says it cannot verify the status of Iran's stockpile, and nonproliferation experts have raised concern that Iran may be moving the material. The first goal of any IAEA visit, Grossi said, would be to check whether agency seals on previously inspected material remain intact and whether any material is missing.

The legal backdrop matters. Iran's IAEA obligations flow from its comprehensive safeguards agreement, entered into pursuant to Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Following Israeli strikes beginning June 13, 2025, and subsequent U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran's parliament passed legislation suspending cooperation with the IAEA, with the law specifying that inspectors would not be allowed to visit nuclear sites without approval from Iran's Supreme National Security Council. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the suspension law into force thereafter. Iran remains a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which requires member states to allow monitoring and inspections of facilities to confirm the peaceful nature of their nuclear programs. Following the 12-day war, Iran permitted IAEA inspections to resume at sites unaffected by strikes, such as the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, but did not allow the agency to resume inspections at bombed nuclear sites or provide updated nuclear material accountancy reports.

The IAEA Board of Governors subsequently passed a resolution urging Iran to fully implement safeguards and provide information about its enriched uranium stockpile, a move that prompted Tehran to formally cancel a prior framework agreement, known as the Cairo Agreement, on a process for resuming safeguards at targeted facilities. In November 2025, the Board passed a further resolution reiterating that Iran must meet its NPT-required safeguards obligations. The current MOU represents the first post-war instrument signed at the presidential level to re-engage the verification question, but it leaves the operational details of IAEA access to be resolved in the 60-day negotiating period, precisely the ambiguity that Grossi and Gharibabadi are now litigating in public.