INARA Poses Legal Constraint on Trump’s Iran Agreement Authority

Secretary of State Marco Rubio committed before a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing to comply with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, a statute originally enacted to constrain executive-branch flexibility in nuclear diplomacy with Tehran and now poised to shape how President Donald Trump handles any agreement with Iran [POLITICO][14-10]. The commitment came as the Trump administration presses toward a framework deal and as questions mount in Congress about which provisions would trigger the law's mandatory review procedures.

INARA, codified as an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, passed the Senate 98-1 and the House 400-25 in May 2015 before President Barack Obama signed it into law [1-5][8-10]. The statute requires the president to transmit any agreement with Iran relating to its nuclear program to Congress within five calendar days of conclusion, together with the full text, a State Department verification assessment, and a certification that the agreement meets U.S. nonproliferation objectives [5-8][6-8]. Upon transmission, the president is prohibited from waiving, suspending, or reducing statutory sanctions against Iran for up to 30 days, the period during which the relevant foreign-affairs committees are required to hold hearings and briefings [2-9][6-9]. If Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval, the sanctions freeze extends for an additional 12 days; if the president vetoes that resolution, a further 10-day period follows [5-15][5-16]. INARA's procedural rules are designed to guarantee floor consideration, effectively forcing both chambers to vote on any covered agreement within the review window [POLITICO].

The central legal question now is what triggers INARA at all. In May 2025 testimony, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, referencing INARA, said "Congress has a right to weigh in on any deal and could actually reverse any deal." The scope of that right depends heavily on the deal's content. Former administration officials who handled Iran policy have indicated, according to POLITICO, that any agreement touching Iran's nuclear program, including language about uranium handling, would trigger the statute [POLITICO]. That reading draws support from the statute's text, which applies to any "agreement with Iran relating to its nuclear program," a phrase that has no de minimis threshold [5-4]. The administration's own public demands reinforce the concern: Trump demanded on Truth Social that Iran "must agree" to never have a nuclear weapon, and that the Strait of Hormuz must be "immediately open" to unrestricted shipping traffic. Any commitment by Iran on nuclear weapons in a signed text could bring the agreement within INARA's reach.

The emerging deal is structured in phases, which adds complexity. The deal is expected to unfold in two phases, according to a regional source with knowledge of the negotiations, with the first phase involving Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz to pre-war status and providing assurances that it will not pursue nuclear weapons. The second phase would open a 60-day window to negotiate on nuclear commitments from Iran and sanctions relief from the U.S., with the first issues being how to dispose of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile and limit further enrichment. Whether a phase-one memorandum of understanding containing nuclear assurances qualifies as a covered "agreement" under INARA is a question the administration has not publicly resolved. Rep. Mike Lawler, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, told POLITICO that any sanctions relief or release of frozen funds would be subject to his review, but he declined to treat references to nuclear matters in a memorandum of understanding as automatically triggering the statute [POLITICO].

Republican opposition to any deal has been vocal. Movement toward a deal has drawn the skepticism of Sen. Roger Wicker, who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Mississippi senator wrote on X that Trump's instincts to "finish the job" in Iran had been sound but seeking a deal now would risk "a perception of weakness." Sen. Lindsey Graham panned any deal that would leave Iran perceived as being a dominant force in the region and in which it would retain its ability to destroy oil infrastructure throughout the Gulf. Graham later expressed conditional confidence in Trump's judgment, and Wicker's criticism predates Trump's announcement that a deal was "largely negotiated" [POLITICO][19-4]. Still, hawkish dissent within the Republican conference is a live variable, because INARA's disapproval mechanism requires only a simple majority in each chamber to pass a resolution, even if an override of a presidential veto would require two-thirds [5-16][5-17].

Democrats have staked out a procedural position. Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told POLITICO that "any deal or agreement with Iran must fully comply with the congressional review provisions" [POLITICO]. Rep. Joaquin Castro invoked INARA directly at the House Foreign Affairs hearing, urging the committee be kept informed of any agreement's details, and Rep. Brad Schneider pressed Rubio on compliance, drawing his commitment on the record [POLITICO]. The administration's formal position, beyond Rubio's hearing statement, is not yet defined. In February 2025, President Trump signed National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, which directs U.S. officials to impose "maximum pressure" on Iran to compel it to abandon its nuclear program and support for terrorist groups. That posture now runs alongside, and potentially in tension with, an active negotiating track that, if it produces a qualifying agreement, will require the executive branch to submit that agreement to the same Congress whose hawkish members have publicly questioned whether any deal is worth making.