Iran Supreme Leader Orders Enriched Uranium Stockpile to Remain in Country

Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has issued a directive prohibiting the transfer of the country's near-weapons-grade uranium stockpile abroad, two senior Iranian officials told Reuters, placing a direct obstacle in front of ongoing ceasefire negotiations between Tehran and Washington. Iranian officials believe that sending the material abroad would leave the country more vulnerable to future attacks by the United States and Israel. Sources also indicated there is "deep suspicion" within Tehran that the current pause in hostilities is a "tactical deception" by Washington to "create a sense of security" before renewing military action. The directive carries the weight of Iran's highest constitutional authority: under the Islamic Republic's governing framework, the Supreme Leader holds final decision-making power over core matters of state, including national security and nuclear policy. Khamenei has the last say on the most important state matters.

The directive lands at a sensitive moment in multilateral negotiations. Talks between the United States and Iran began in April 2025 following a letter from President Trump to the Supreme Leader, with Trump setting a 60-day deadline for Iran to reach an agreement. Following nearly six weeks of conflict, Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced a conditional two-week ceasefire in April, during which talks on a lasting agreement would be held. Iran's state-linked Iranian Students' News Agency reported May 21 that Tehran is preparing its response to the latest U.S. draft proposal, noting that the draft has narrowed some gaps but that further reduction requires an end to what Iran characterizes as an American "temptation of war," and that Iran is currently negotiating on a broad framework, specific details, and confidence-building measures. Pakistani mediators have been working to strike a deal that would extend the ceasefire and pave the way for lasting peace.

The disposition of Iran's enriched uranium sits at the core of the dispute. The IAEA estimated Iran held 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity at the time of the U.S.-Israeli strikes on its nuclear facilities in June 2025, and how much of that material survived is unclear; IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated in March that what remained was "mainly" stored in a tunnel complex at the Isfahan nuclear facility, with the agency estimating slightly more than 200 kilograms located there. The IAEA also believes some material remains at the Natanz nuclear complex, where Iran operated two enrichment plants. Sixty-percent enrichment is significantly above the level required for civilian uses and is assessed to be a short technical step from weapons-grade material. The June 2025 U.S. strikes severely damaged Iran's major uranium enrichment facilities but did not remove or help account for the approximately 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% U-235 that Iran had already stockpiled.

One Iranian source indicated that Tehran is not without alternative positions. One source said, "There are solutions like diluting the stockpile under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency." The two sides have started to narrow some gaps, the sources said, but deeper splits remain over Tehran's nuclear program, including the fate of its enriched uranium stockpiles and Tehran's demand for recognition of its right to enrichment. Iranian officials have repeatedly said Tehran's priority is to secure a permanent end to the war and credible guarantees against further U.S. and Israeli strikes, and that only after such assurances are in place would Iran be prepared to engage in detailed negotiations over its nuclear program. The IAEA option would require Iran to maintain full safeguards cooperation, which it has effectively suspended: the military strikes derailed Iranian cooperation with the IAEA, and the agency has not been able to access any of the bombed sites or account for the nuclear material, which constitutes a violation of Iran's safeguards obligations.

President Trump, speaking to reporters at the White House on May 21, restated his position that the United States will not permit Iran to retain the stockpile. "We will get it," Trump said. "We don't need it, we don't want it. We'll probably destroy it after we get it, but we're not going to let them have it." Israeli officials have told Reuters that Trump has privately assured Israel that Iran's enriched uranium will be sent out of the country and that any peace deal must include that clause. The administration has previously set the transfer of Iran's uranium as a formal precondition: by mid-May, Trump had reportedly set five preconditions for resumed deal negotiations, including delivery of 400 kilograms of enriched uranium to the United States. White House spokesperson Olivia Wales, when asked to comment on the Reuters report, stated that "President Trump has been clear about the United States' red lines and will only make a deal that puts the American people first" [POLITICO].

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has drawn the same line publicly. Netanyahu stated that the war is "not over" because highly enriched uranium remains in Iran, telling CBS News' "60 Minutes" that the material needs to be removed and the country's enrichment facilities dismantled. Netanyahu stated that if there is an agreement, the preferred method of removal is to "go in and take it out." Netanyahu suggested the uranium can be physically removed with or without an agreement with Tehran, and that the U.S. is on board with either option, though he declined to discuss military plans or a timeline. The present standoff echoes the trajectory of past negotiations. The Obama administration's 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action imposed verifiable limits on Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, but the first Trump administration abandoned the agreement in 2018. Despite Trump's subsequent "maximum pressure" sanctions, Iran used the intervening years to advance its nuclear knowledge and amass sizable stockpiles of enriched uranium. The JCPOA precedent is directly relevant to the current impasse: the JCPOA barred any production of highly enriched uranium by Iran through 2030, a constraint that no longer binds either party following the 2018 withdrawal. With Khamenei's directive now on record and Trump's public position unchanged, negotiators face a gap on the stockpile question that neither side has yet offered a concrete mechanism to bridge.