The Supreme Court's 6-3 ruling in Trump v. Slaughter overturns Humphrey's Executor, letting presidents fire independent agency commissioners at will and reshaping the regulatory state.
The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 on June 29 that President Trump lawfully fired Federal Trade Commission Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter without cause, overturning the 91-year-old precedent set in *Humphrey's Executor v. United States* [1]. Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, declared that the decision eliminated what remains of *Humphrey's Executor*, the 1935 ruling that had shielded officers of independent federal agencies from at-will presidential removal [1]. The decision resolves a direct constitutional confrontation over whether Congress can insulate agency commissioners from executive control by limiting the grounds for their dismissal.
Slaughter, a Democratic appointee to the FTC, challenged her removal in federal court after the Trump administration terminated her without citing cause [1]. The case reached the Supreme Court as *Trump v. Slaughter*, with the central question being whether statutory for-cause removal protections at multi-member independent commissions survive Article II's vesting of executive power in the President [1]. Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented [1].
The substantive reach of the ruling extends well beyond the FTC. The majority's reasoning casts doubt on removal protections at a range of commissions and boards, including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission [1]. For-cause tenure provisions at those agencies now face a viable constitutional challenge under the logic the Court applied here. The Federal Reserve's structure drew separate but related scrutiny in companion litigation decided the same day, raising questions about the insulation of its Board of Governors [2].
The ruling hands the current and all future presidents authority to remove commissioners of independent regulatory bodies at will, regardless of party affiliation or the statutory protections Congress enacted [1]. It effectively collapses the doctrinal distinction between executive agencies and independent agencies that administrative law scholars and practitioners have relied on since the New Deal era [2]. Regulated industries, consumer advocates, and civil rights organizations that depend on independent enforcement postures at agencies like the EEOC will need to reassess litigation strategies and enforcement expectations.
What comes next is likely a cascade of removal actions and fresh constitutional challenges across the regulatory state [1]. Congress may attempt to respond through legislation, though any new removal protections would face the same constitutional barrier the Court erected today. Lower federal courts will also confront petitions from officials at other multi-member bodies arguing that their statutory protections survive under narrower readings of the majority opinion.