The Supreme Court has yet to rule in Trump v. Cook, with justices signaling the Fed's unique structure may shield it from a broad removal-power ruling.
The Supreme Court has not yet issued its decision in *Trump v. Cook*, a case that will determine whether President Donald Trump can remove Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook while her legal challenge to that removal proceeds [1]. During oral arguments, multiple justices signaled that the Federal Reserve's statutory structure and its central role in monetary policy may place it in a distinct category from other independent agencies, a distinction that could shield the Fed from any broad ruling curtailing removal protections [1][2].
The case reaches the Court amid a broader executive-power offensive. The justices are simultaneously considering *Seila Law*'s progeny and a companion challenge targeting the structure of multi-member independent agencies more directly, with *Humphrey's Executor v. United States*, the 1935 precedent protecting agency heads from at-will removal, squarely in the crosshairs [2]. Cook, a sitting Fed governor, was removed by Trump and brought suit contesting the action as unlawful under her statutory tenure protections. The case is before the Supreme Court of the United States in Washington [1].
The substantive stakes are considerable on two tracks. First, if the Court overrules or narrows *Humphrey's Executor* in the companion case, a Fed-specific carve-out in *Cook* would determine whether that ruling flows through to central bank governance. Second, the justices' reported skepticism about treating the Fed identically to bodies like the NLRB or FTC reflects the Fed's unique mandate: it controls the money supply, sets the federal funds rate, and serves as lender of last resort [2]. A ruling that subjects the Fed chair or governors to presidential removal at will could unsettle bond markets and raise dollar-stability concerns that extend well beyond domestic administrative law [1][2].
What comes next depends on sequencing. The Court is expected to release opinions in both *Cook* and the related removal-power cases before the term ends in late June 2026 [1]. If the justices carve the Fed out on structural grounds while otherwise limiting *Humphrey's Executor*, the practical result would be a two-tier removal doctrine, one standard for most independent agencies and a more durable tenure protection for the central bank. Practitioners watching executive-power litigation should treat the Fed carve-out as a potential template for future arguments about other financially specialized regulators, including the OCC and the FDIC [2].